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6 May 1952

MEMO FOR FILES

SUBJECT: [ ] Original Discussion with Hahn and RNPILLOW on 29 April.

1. On 29 April a discussion was held between RNPillow, Hahn and [ ] in the presence of [ ]. RNPillow and Hahn showed a certain amount of surprise at [ ]'s knowledge of Latvian and the Latvian situation in general. ~~It was~~ Explained to them that [ ]'s father worked in the U.S. Embassy at Riga and that during this time [ ] as a teenager, had an opportunity to learn the language, people, and country. The conversation took the form of a general discussion of the Latvian situation. Hahn and RNPillow ~~sincerely~~ desired that they be informed of the reason for ~~delay~~ of the operation and were informed that news which had been received from several reliable sources indicates that the situation on the ground is bad enough to warrant postponement of the operation until fall, providing the agents will agree to undertake a fall mission. They were further informed that we are awaiting confirmation of this information within the next two or three days, at which time a final decision will be made. A discussion of the contacts in Latvia, furnished by Hahn, brought out the fact that these contacts are indeed four years old and can not be checked upon in any way. *the initial stages of*
2. RNPillow, the most talkative of the two in this conversation, indicated great attachment to the agents whom he feels he is protecting and consequently made a number of pointed questions to determine the exact truth regarding the postponement. However he was informed that [ ] is unable

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to reveal any further information. During the first part of the conversation Hahn was reluctant to take part in any of the discussion and therefore [ ] prevailed upon him to relate all the incidents and all the details pertaining to the entire Valdemar complex, and his role therein, beginning in 1943. Hahn complied and in his narrative brought out a great number of points which were unknown to [ ] as well as to [ ] and [ ] particularly in connection with Broadway. It appears that in 1949 Hahn was contacted by the Broadway representative who was sent to him by — what Hahn considers a member of his group — a Latvian Captain Skobe. Apparently Skobe had heard that Valdemar had been able to arrive in Sweden from Latvia and having gotten in touch with Hahn informed him that the Broadway representative would visit Hahn and discuss possible cooperation with Hahn's group. At a great disadvantage to himself Hahn gave the Broadway representative the majority of his Valdemar contacts, as well as one of the two signal plans that Valdemar had set up with Hahn. The signal plan that Hahn furnished Broadway is the only one that can be utilized since the book <sup>Plan</sup> which the other was based upon was lost by Valdemar and can not be procured <sup>in Latvia</sup>.

The Broadway representative promised Hahn that he would get in touch with him again but failed <sup>to</sup> do so for a prolonged period of time at which time he again contacted Hahn and requested that Hahn furnish him further contacts leading to Valdemar so that Broadway may be able to transmit to Valdemar finances designed to aid the partisans and the underground.

3. Another important factor of which [ ] is complete unaware was the fact that RNPillow, without clearing with [ ] Hahn, or anyone else in authority, provided the agents with a contact only known to him. This contact appears to be a relative of RNPillow's about whom he often has made remarks. Consequently [ ] were not quite as surprised

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by this ~~secret~~ as was [ ]

4. Because of the late hour the conference was discontinued when Hahn in his narrative approached 1950. It was decided that Hahn would continue his narrative at a subsequent meeting.

5. From this discussion [ ] drew the following conclusions :

- a. Hahn and to a certain extent RNPillow, has completely blown himself to Broadway, to the Tibers, and to the FIS (through the cooperation with Janis Lukins, who appears to have been backed by FIS) and to the Tilbury group. To what extent RNPillow is blown has not been determined, however it must be assumed that his cooperation with Hahn has been instrumental in arousing the <sup>of the</sup> interests of the aforementioned parties, although RNPillow continually remarked that he had little to do with this entire business which he considers to be politics.
- b. Hahn has shown in the past extremely poor judgement, especially in his dealings with Broadway to whom he apparently turned over a complete operational plan without any benefit to himself. His remarks indicated that he has been sorry about this ever since Broadway took possession of the operations plan and completely disregarded him.
- c. Hahn admits quite freely that ~~now~~ in his mind there is no doubt that he must be known to the RIS because of the controversiality which surrounds him in Sweden and because of his extensive activities, not only with foreign intelligence agencies, but also with Latvian groups dabbling in various intelligence activities in Sweden.

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d. DYCLAIM has very little if any operational control over the Hahn complex. The discussion has revealed that if Hahn cared to he could have arranged with the agents, through RNPillow, a completely separate signal plan which he may use as a means to insure further employment with DYCLAIM.

On 30 April 1952 [ ] held a lengthy discussion with CAMUSOs 1, 2, and 3 in the presence of [ ] and RNPillow. The agents, whose morale appeared to be quite low, demanded an explanation for the cancellation of the operation. They were informed that our greatest interest is to keep them alive not only immediately after the drop, but also for the entire stay in ~~xx~~ their own country. Emphasizing that latest information received by us has revealed that they have a smaller than 50-50 chance to stay alive and therefore — hoping that in several months we will be able to provide a safer situation on the ground — we were forced to cancel the operation. The most talkative and inquisitive agent was Camuso 1. He attempted to impress [ ] with his past experience as an active partisan and stated that he is quite confident that he could manage to stay alive even under adverse conditions. CAMUSO 1 appears to be the type to make spot judgements which often may not be based on any proof whatsoever. CAMUSO 2 though more reserved than CAMUSO 1, is certainly a good deal more talkative than CAMUSO 3. CAMUSO 2 was extremely disappointed that the operation was postponed and joined the other two in the request that we review the situation and possibly make a decision to conduct the operation anyway. They were given the same promise as were Hahn and RNPillow, that we were awaiting further confirmation of the disturbing news we have received

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and will inform them ~~soon~~ in a day or two when this confirmation ~~will~~ would be available. The agents impressed [ ] with ~~themselves~~ their zeal, and enthusiasm, as well as their eagerness to undertake the mission for the liberation of the homeland. The offhand impression that [ ] received was that as a team the CAMUSOs certainly are above average. Individually they can not measure up to [ ] and [ ] the two potential agents in the U.S.

6. Subsequent discussions with Hahn and RNPillow led [ ] to believe that neither of these two contract agents are really certain that their operational plan will succeed. Their information is scanty and outdated. The contacts provided by them are four and eight years old and, as already mentioned before, they agree with [ ] that the fact that the RIS may have become knowledgeable of their participation with DYCLAIM as well as possibly the agents' identity, is ~~is~~ creating a most unhealthy situation. A further disturbing factor was brought out during these discussions. Under the guidance of [ ] and RNPillow they have been attempting to create a Latvian guard company. For this purpose [ ] was contacted Catura, who, in addition to spotting potential guard company members, also in the initial period of this operation recruited CAMUSO 3. Being a confidant of Col. Janums, it appears that Catura has at least indicated to Jamums, if not ~~not~~ thoroughly revealed to him the nature of his cooperation and contact with DYCLAIM. Hahn and RNPillow have been disturbed by the fact that Jamums mentioned his contact with American Intelligence at the recent London conference attended by many important Latvians who are attempting to unite the emigration with what is suspected to be Broadway support. During a four-day stay with the agents [ ] has been successful in convincing CAMUSOs 1 and 2 that compartmentalization in intelligence work is

of the essence. These two agents were informed that inasmuch as the spring operation has been cancelled a completely new plan will be provided for the fall dispatch. They agreed that this plan should not be revealed to anyone except the agents themselves and [ ] Furthermore they also indicated agreement that the control and compromise indicators, their drop zone, and mode <sup>+ time</sup> of dispatch should also not be revealed to anyone but to the agents and to [ ]

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